JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL

SEA BASING: A 21ST CENTURY ENABLING CAPABILITY

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

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ABSTRACT

As the Department of Defense prepares for the 21st century security environment, tough decisions will need to be made within a fiscally constrained budget. These decisions must rest upon the guidance contained in the national strategies, Global Defense Posture, and Transformation Planning Guidance. Sea basing meets this guidance regardless of the composition of ground forces. Furthermore, sea basing is especially effective in response to the lesser contingencies that are anticipated due to the effects of globalization. While the ground forces within the sea base can consist of Soldiers or Marines, the inherent relationships maintained between the Navy and Marine Corps maximize the flexibility and expeditionary power projection capabilities presented in the sea basing concept. With this capability, other joint capabilities will be enhanced with integration at the operational level. Thus, the naval expeditionary power projection provided through sea basing is an effective joint force enabler for the 21st century security environment. In the current fiscally constrained budget, the integration of the lift necessary to fully employ the Army via the sea base is not essential to the execution of the National Security Strategy.

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Introduction

The United States military force planning process is focused on the requirements set forth in the 2006 National Security Strategy.[1] With an emphasis on the global security environment, naval power projection continues to be an essential element that enables the United States to influence world affairs in order to meet its vital national interests. Starting in the 1990s and affirmed in the coordinated terrorist attacks against America in September 2001, the global security environment changed drastically from a bi-polar, superpower nation-on- nation conflict to an environment influenced by globalization. This type of environment encourages asymmetric threats and presents anti-access issues. Currently, a fundamental transformation within the military is ongoing to effectively operate in this 21st century environment. Overall, the military is shifting to a modular, more rapidly deployable force designed toward defending against asymmetric threats, yet capable of executing a potential major war. In the case of naval combat power, the emphasis is on littoral operations. Sea basing is a concept being developed to project naval combat power ashore using the largest global common as a maneuver space and reducing the United States global anti-access concerns. The naval expeditionary power projection provided through sea basing is an effective joint force enabler for the 21st century security environment. In the current fiscally constrained budget, the integration

of the lift necessary to fully deploy the Army via the sea base is not essential to the execution of the National Security Strategy.

In the *National Defense Authorization Act of 1996, Public Law 104-201* , Congress listed findings that directly influenced the military force development and planning process. Congressional findings determined that as of 1996, there was a "need to reevaluate the military posture of the United States, but the pace of global change necessitates a new, comprehensive assessment"[2] in order "to meet the threats of the United States in the twenty-first century."[3] As a result, "the Secretary of Defense endorsed a quadrennial review of the defense program at the beginning of each newly elected President"[4] in order to "determine and express the defense strategy."[5] Two of the major themes emerging from the subsequent 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review were *transformation* and *jointness*. As such, these themes became and remain a driving force guiding the fundamental changes within the Department of Defense. However, changes of this magnitude are expensive and influence a constrained budget. To complicate the budget decision, America is engaged in a Global War on Terrorism involving two concurrent major combat operations in two countries. The finances involved in sustained major combat operations are significant and increase the difficulty of fundamentally changing the United States military into a 21st century global security environment force. Each emerging concept currently being developed focuses on *transformation* and *jointness*.

The sea basing concept exemplifies emerging programs that require difficult budget and force planning decisions. Decisions will need to be made across all the services in a sea domain that has predominantly been a naval realm. In essence, the magnitude of

"being able to use the sea as a joint maneuver space, not just a naval maneuver space, ... is going to be one of the biggest engines for change."[6] Future sea basing is meant to be a Combatant Commander's joint force enabler by *closing the seams* within their Area of Responsibility. It is imperative for the budget and force planning decision making process to consider the employment of each of the services in order to optimize the effective joint combat power of the United States Armed Forces. At some point, however, a decision will have to be made to either fully fund, partially fund, or not fund sea basing and its integration within all Services. Additionally, decisions made on sea basing will have direct correlation with the funding of other programs.

The mission of the 2005 National Defense Strategy is to win the Global War on Terrorism while the military is transformed into an organization that is able to meet the challenges of the 21st century global security environment. The global security environment that is outlined in the 2002 National Security Strategy was formed as a result of the first stage of the Global War on Terrorism and has changed since the end of the cold war. Globalization and complexity are important influences within this security environment and will determine how the United States plans and postures forces to ensure its national strategy. The Department of Defense has already started to respond to the changing environment by restructuring the military Global Defense Posture. Specifically, the Secretary of Defense commented during 2005 Congressional Testimony that the Defense "Department is making long overdue changes to U.S. global basing, moving away from obsolete Cold War garrisons and placing emphasis on the ability to surge quickly to trouble spots across the globe."[7] In order to surge quickly, the Defense Department is "making U.S. forces more agile and expeditionary."[8]

Sea basing is an important part of this ongoing transformation within the Department of Defense. However, sea basing is only one of the many adaptations that will enable the military to perform its role in protecting national interests. All of the services are working toward a more agile expeditionary force that can respond to today's global environment while maintaining the capability to defeat a potential rising competitor.[9] With these potential changes within the services, risks are involved. These risks are addressed in the National Defense Strategy and that influence the Department of Defense's transformation process.

To fully examine the applicability of an operational concept in the 21st century, the guidelines within the transformation process must first be examined. The National Security Strategy provides guidance to the Defense Department along with the other elements of national power. Using this guidance, the Secretary of Defense promulgated a National Defense Strategy in 2005 that formed a policy enabling the military to support the President's strategy. Before 2005, the Quadrennial Defense Review was utilized for this purpose. From the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Secretary of Defense established a Transformation Planning Guidance in 2003 that provided guidance for each of the service Transformation Roadmaps. An integrated approach is essential; with any change, fiscal impacts must be considered. The DOD budget consisted of approximately 3%[10] of the national Gross Domestic Product in 2004. Therefore, for any transformational concept, such as sea basing, the overarching guidance must be understood prior to making any decisions that affect the current and future capabilities of the military. As previously stated, risks are involved with each of the different

transformation efforts and balancing these risks is essential to America's vital national interests.

Sea basing is one of the concepts being developed as a joint force enabler for the Combatant Commander. Two of the central themes within both the national strategy and transformation guidance: capabilities must be joint and capabilities-based. Thus, this paper will address joint warfare concepts of operations as a whole, along with joint amphibious concepts of operations. These concepts will form a baseline that will facilitate relative discussions concerning service capabilities, logistics, and maneuver warfare using historical references. World War II, Korea, and Desert Storm collectively demonstrated the importance of forward land and sea bases as part of the national security strategy. These insights will further enable the exploration of effective sea base utilization in a joint environment.

Overall, this research will explore the sea basing concept in its transformational development to meet the 21st century security environment. By analyzing the concept from a developmental point of view in response to the current national guidance, insight will emerge as to both the direction of the military and its ability to implement the National Security Strategy while managing resource constraints. In balancing the risks within the national strategy, the following questions must be considered: *Does a capability have to be transformational to be developed or is modernization enough? Does a capability have to be joint to be developed? And what makes a capability joint (two military departments or operational integration)?* With the military's current involvement in the Global War on Terrorism, fiscal constraints will continue to rise and make these questions essential to America's national interests.

<u>Approach</u>

The military is faced with the challenges involved with fighting a war while transforming a force for future wars throughout the 21st century. America "must win the Global War on Terrorism … prepare for wars we may have to fight later in this decade by making a number of long-delayed investments in procurement, people and modernization … and prepare for the wars of the future."[11] These challenges will force the Department of Defense to make difficult decisions as to whether a capability is a *nice to have* or a *must have*. In other words, the budget will not enable the military to develop every new concept that is presented even though it may have merit. Depending on the circumstances, it may be better to modernize existing capabilities, partially, or fully develop new concepts. As a concept, sea basing is being considered a fundamental shift from the current capabilities of amphibious operations and logistics. The question that must be asked is whether the military should modernize current capabilities, partially develop the sea basing concept (potentially spiral developing toward the complete development) or fully develop the concept for maximum utilization by all services. Thus, the overall operational integration of sea basing within the National Defense Strategy is at the heart of the difficult questions facing the Department of Defense.

In order to fully analyze sea basing, this paper will define sea basing along with the variables that contribute to both the necessity and successful development of emerging concepts. These variables include the National Security Strategy, the 2003 Transformation Planning Guidance, and Joint Warfare operations/considerations.

Using historical references, completed studies, and documented perspectives, analysis will first entail looking at sea basing with Marine Corps units assigned as the expeditionary ground force. This analysis will focus on the applicability of sea basing within the National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy. A critical component of both strategies is the current and projected 21st century global security environment. This portion of the research will formulate a base understanding of the concept development process that supports a forecasted uncertain security environment and provide initial insight into the applicability of the sea basing concept.

Once a national strategy and transformation assessment of sea basing is complete, research will shift to examine the applicability of sea basing in a joint environment. This analysis will comprise of historical references and guiding principles. The results of this portion of analysis provide insight into the questions mentioned in the introduction concerning the degree of transformation and *jointness* necessary for the effectiveness of sea basing in the 21st century. These questions are essential in making difficult budgetary decisions and form a business approach. Trade-off identification is an essential part of concept development because it enables the leadership to make difficult decisions from a *holistic* point of view.

Once the established policy and strategies are examined, this research will assess the sea basing concept using a force planning model developed by Thomas Bartlett that incorporates strategy[12] and a qualitative security environment assessment. This assessment along with a case study will help to correlate the original findings and provide further insight into the issue. Finally, upon completion of these assessments this report

will discuss the relevancy of the findings, make recommendations, and delineate conclusions.

Chapter 2

Sea Basing: 21st Century Concept

Background

Throughout history, warfare has evolved to incorporate new technologies and concepts that address both the changing political environment and the capabilities of emerging threats that can influence national interests. Although references to amphibious operations date back to the invasion of Britain in 55 BC, [13] a concept emerged in the 1930s that formed a doctrinal approach to amphibious operations integrating land, air, and sea power to maximize combat effectiveness.[14] This emergence was brought about by the lessons learned from the unsuccessful Gallipoli operation.[15] The development of amphibious doctrine led to the successful joint force landings in both theaters during WWII which was essential to the overall war effort.

After WWII, amphibious operations were still a major part of the Navy's roles and missions; however, the competing bi-polar environment of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union contributed to the U.S. Navy's focus on open-ocean, blue water dominance. The Soviet Union possessed a highly capable Navy that could sustain operations at sea that enabled forward presence operations. In order for America to protect its national interests, the Navy developed its capabilities using a threat based approach. However, with the end of the Cold War, the global environment changed and

the United States Navy no longer had a *peer competitor* in the open-ocean domain. A 1990 U.S. National Security Strategy shifted from a global focus to a period of regional uncertainty that called for a corresponding regional military focus. In 1992, the Navy and Marine Corps realized that a fundamental shift in priorities was necessary in order to fulfill its mission within the National Security Policy and wrote a collaborative *From the Sea* white paper to solidify the new naval focus. [16]

The writing of the white paper was in essence the beginning of a merging of the Navy and Marine Corp visions. From this point on, naval forces would focus on operations in the littorals and fulfill the roles of strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, and an enabling crisis response with an emphasis on joint operations.[17] The current National Security Strategy in essence shifted from warfighting on the sea toward joint operations *from the sea*[18] to provide the initial enabling capability for joint combat operations and rapid response to an emerging crisis.[19] In 1997, the Marine Corps presented a vision in the *Operational Maneuver from the Sea* concept paper that built upon the synergistic shift to a littoral focus and a better understanding of the importance of maritime maneuver warfare in naval power projection.[20] The combination of these papers laid the foundation of both the Navy Sea Power 21 and Marine Corps 21 strategies. In essence, these strategies along with the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and 2003 Transformation Planning Guidance led to the development of sea basing in the 2003 Naval Transformation Roadmap[21] and form a baseline that facilitates analysis of the emerging concept.

<u>Sea Basing</u>

As with any emerging concept, there are different definitions associated with sea basing. According to Thomas Hone, the Assistant Director of Risk Management, the Office of Force Transformation, sea basing is defined as the "elimination of the conceptual difference between operations on land and operations on or from the sea."[22] In the *Naval Transformation Roadmap 2003: Assured Access & Power Projection …From the Sea*, sea basing is defined as "the overarching transformational operating concept for projecting and sustaining naval power and joint forces which assures joint access by leveraging the operational maneuver of sovereign, distributed, and networked forces operating globally from the sea."[23] Within version 1.0 of the Sea Basing Joint Integrating Concept (JIC), sea basing is defined as the "rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and re-employment of joint combat power from the sea, while providing continuous support, sustainment, and force protection to select expeditionary joint forces without reliance on land bases within the Joint Operations Area (JOA). These capabilities expand operational maneuver options, and facilitate assured access and entry from the sea."[24]

The definition within the Sea Basing Joint Integrating Concept will be used as the guiding sea basing definition for analysis since it is being used by the Joint Staff in its capabilities-based assessment process. However, the previously referenced Office of Transformation and 2003 Naval Transformation Roadmap definitions illustrate the importance of understanding the overall capabilities within the sea basing concept. As expressed by Admiral Mullen, the Chief of Naval Operations, during a January 10, 2006 Surface Navy Association National Symposium, sea basing is "about capabilities, not just

ships."[25] Thus, using the Sea Basing JIC, sea basing will be considered as "the overarching framework within which the Navy and Marine Corps will transform our core capabilities to increase the effect of naval forces in joint campaigns."[26] Within this framework, sea basing can be best described addressing the combat logistics, defensive capabilities, and offensive capabilities.

Depending on the situation, a combination of escort, logistic, amphibious, and pre-positioned ships will form the nucleus of a sea base. The escorts will provide protection and serve as a power projection capability through Land Attack Cruise Missile and naval gunfire employment. The amphibious ships will provide transport and serve as a launching platform for ground forces. Logistic ships along with pre-positioned ships will sustain at sea operations and provide ground force sustainment materials, respectively. As for the ground combat force deployment, embarked Marines will deploy via naval airlift and sealift directly into combat and receive sustained support via the same lift capabilities.[27] Additional forces will be transported to a secure forward base within 2000 Nautical Miles (NM)[28] of the sea base where they will be further transferred to the sea base where they will unite with their equipment provided by the pre-positioned ships. Once these forces are combat ready, they will deploy and be sustained by naval airlift and sealift assets. The pre-positioned ships will be configured in a way that permits selective offload operations at sea to support operations as needed.[29] In the vision of some, Army units will also be deployed from the sea base in the manner discussed above. Providing this enabling capability is at a great cost but provides only minimum additional flexibility.

Combat Logistics (Pre-positioned Assets)

All four services use ships for sustainment. As a standard operating procedure, the Navy uses combat logistics ships to provide stores necessary to sustain operations at sea. The other services use pre-position assets to ensure stores are available for combat at great distances from the United States. In the case of the Air Force, ammunition is forward deployed on ships that enable the initial and re-supply of overseas bases. However, in the context of sea basing, the pre-positioned logistics of the Army and Marine Corps are the focus of this research pertaining to sustainment operations. Both the Army and Marine Corps pre-position materials, such as heavy equipment and ammunition, which are necessary for the beginning stages of sustained combat operations.

The Marine Corps pre-position ships are part of the Maritime Pre-positioning Force (MPF) which forward deploy in Maritime Pre-positioning Squadrons (MPS). Three Maritime Pre-positioning Squadrons are currently forward deployed to three different regions. In terms of sustainment capability, "One squadron of MPF ships can provide all the equipment and supplies to support a U.S. Marine Expeditionary Brigade of about 15,000 personnel for 30 days. The ships are capable of off-loading at piers or offshore with special lighterage equipment. Each ship has roll-on/roll-off capability and a flight deck for helicopter operations."[30] However, with the development of sea basing, these ships will selectively offload at sea and deliver sustained logistics directly to the Marine Corps ground combat forces. Additionally, with a forward operating base up to 2000 NM away in a safe location and high speed connectors, the MPF ships would be able to sustain up to two Marine Expeditionary Brigades for at least 30 days or even,

conceptually, indefinitely. High speed connectors are transport aircraft and vessels that move materials and personnel within a theater of operations. As for the Army's Combat Pre-positioning Forces,

> they provide afloat pre-positioning for the equipment, munitions and supplies to support U.S. Army combat units that would deploy to potential contingency sites. The Army has a similar design that is referred to as Afloat Pre-positioning Squadrons (APS). The ships within an Afloat Pre-positioning Squadron are part of the Combat Pre-positioning Force. The Combat Pre-positioning Force concept of operations calls for at-sea pre-positioning of combat equipment for a 2x2 heavy armored brigade and the 1x2 6th Brigade Afloat aboard eight LMSRs. In addition, other CPF ships carry cargo that supports and sustains the brigade, providing items such as water purification units, food and initial combat support equipment. The mix of cargo carried on CPF ships makes it possible for an armored brigade to open a theater of operations for follow-on units.[31]

The current concept for at sea pre-positioning forces is to unload stores into a Sea Port of Debarkation (SPOD) where a logistics hub is established for a given conflict. Access must be obtained in order to execute the establishment of a SPOD. However, there are concerns over anti-access and minimizing logistical foot-prints due to the emerging 21st century environment.

In 1996, Turkey and Saudi Arabia refused access to the United States. The U.S. was responding to the Iraq's attacks against the Kurds.[32] The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 along with Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom culminated this growing concern over necessary military access. The 2001 terrorist attack further complicated access issues since it solidified the requirement for a global presence and response. For Operation Enduring Freedom, many of the United States' Arab Allies refused the use of bases "for combat aircraft participating in the campaign against Afghanistan."[33] Most recently, Turkey refused access needed to accomplish Operation

Iraqi Freedom[34] as it was planned. A fiscally constrained budget coupled with a necessity to increase force protection due to a potential threat of asymmetrical attacks against military forces are issues causing the military to minimize logistic footprints. These concerns over anti-access and logistic footprints have fostered the development of sea basing.

Sea basing would remove the SPOD requirement by maintaining these supplies at sea and delivering them as needed to the warfighter. Currently, the Navy is developing a version of the MPS called the Maritime Pre-positioning Forces (Future) (MPF(F)) that will enable Marine Corps supplies to flow as envisioned in the sea basing concept. No decisions have been made in respect to the APS logistics. While these pre-positioning forces were successfully utilized and necessary for operations such as Desert Storm and the current Operation Iraqi Freedom, the drain of serviceable combat equipment from the conflict has surfaced concerns regarding the current status and the cost associated with replacing the sea based stockpiles.

Defensive Capabilities

Sea basing is a formation of ships that are assembled to project combat power ashore. Like assets on land, sea borne assets need to be defended in order to accomplish their missions. For sea basing, this requires the attainment sea superiority or the ability to maneuver freely within the sea domain without a credible enemy capability to restrict movement. The defensive capabilities required to achieve sea superiority come from networked organic and non-organic assets in theater. In the sea domain, there are three mediums to defend. They are aerospace, surface, and sub-surface. Air Force assets can

contribute in the defense against both air and surface threats. Current Navy development
is focused on dominance within the littorals which will support sea basing. The
capabilities of the threat will drive the number and type of naval escorts required to
defend the sea base. In effect, the escorts will provide an umbrella of coverage that will
extend beyond the shore, thus removing the traditional *shoreline seam.* Additionally, the
escorts are also being developed as part of the offensive sea basing capabilities.

<u>Offensive Capabilities</u>

Although the main focus on Sea basing consists of the ability to project ground
combat power ashore, it has other capabilities that can be an enabler for the Combatant
Commander. Thus, it is important to assess all of the offensive capabilities inherent
within this concept. While escorts that are part of the sea base will provide the necessary
protection, cruise missiles and carrier launched aircraft project power ashore along with
the ground forces that are embarked on forward deployed naval ships. Historically,
ground forces have successfully projected combat power ashore in the form of
amphibious operations and both the Army and Marine Corps have participated in such
operations. As such, both ground forces must at least be considered during the analysis
of this research. While either service can be used as the ground force, the difference
between amphibious operations and sea basing is the employment or maneuver of the
ground forces. In amphibious operations, ground forces approach the shoreline and seize
an amphibious lodgment. Then logistical support arrives to support sustained operations.
In sea basing the employment of land forces is focused on Expeditionary Maneuver

Warfare (EMW) through a Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM) that is based around the concept of Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS).

The concept of "Operational Maneuver from the Sea applies the principles and philosophy of EMW to the sea space."[35] The establishment of an Operational Maneuver from the Sea concept "codifies the many lessons of history regarding how command of the sea can create an operational advantage through a maneuver warfare approach."[36] During the Korean War, General MacArthur used the sea domain to outmaneuver the adversary. The 1950 landing at Inchon demonstrated the effectiveness of using the sea as a maneuver space. With the execution of this envelopment from the sea, General MacArthur placed a ground force in the enemy's rear, severed the enemy's Lines of Communication, and dislodged the enemy from the southern Korean Peninsula.[37] In essence, control and utilization of the littorals as a maneuver space causes an enemy to defend the entire coastline and enables a sea based force to choose the optimum time and location for an attack or insertion.[38]

In concert with Operational Maneuver from the Sea, Ship-to-Objective Maneuver is a concept that focuses on the objective and will fundamentally change the way in which the United States fights in the 21st Century. It removes the previously established boundary between land and sea within the battlespace. In the past, naval expeditionary power projection relied on the establishment of a logistics hub on land prior to follow-on maneuvers against inland objectives. With the Ship-to-Objective Maneuver, ground forces will be employed and sustained directly from the sea which increases operational flexibility in terms of operational reach and reduces the military footprint and ground force logistic requirements.

Just as the previously cited Inchon landing exemplifies the importance of Operational Maneuver from the Sea, it also is an example that illustrates the necessity of inherent access flexibility using a Ship-to-Objective Maneuver. The tidal conditions prevalent off the coast of Seoul were such that an amphibious landing was only feasible during a three to four day period each month.[39] With knowledge of this environmental window, an adversary can plan and establish a formidable defense based on limited access options. However, the capabilities envisioned within the sea basing concept, coupled with a Ship-to-Objective Maneuver, not only opens up the whole coastline for a possible assault; but also opens the possible window to any day of the year.

In order to fully understand the coverage enabled through a Ship-to-Objective Maneuver using sea basing, one must assess the operational reach potential. In June of 2000, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command released a Mission Area Analysis Operational Reach Final Report that assessed the operational reach predicted by 2015.[40]

Marine Corps Operational Reach - 2015 Analysis [41]

The Marine Corps Combat Development Command conducted a study in 2000 that addressed the employment of ground forces using the concept of Ship-to-Objective Maneuver. Although the study addressed surface assault, it primarily focused on the vertical assault operational reach. A base case was developed that consisted of employing a Regimental Landing Team to an objective 86 nautical miles from the afloat launching platforms. An additional nine miles was added to the flight profile to account for the inevitable deviations necessary to complete the maneuver. Thus, for the base

case, the air bridge covered 95 nautical miles. As for the Regimental Landing Team, it "consisted of three infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, a combat engineer company, and four LAAD firing sections."[42] As far as lift, this composition of forces consisted of 3,823 people and 479 vehicles.[43]

Once the base case was established, excursions were conducted by changing the distance to the objective and load out plan. In order to employ the Regimental Landing Team, the Marine Air Ground Task Force utilized 78 MV-22s and 28 CH-53Es. Taking into account the speed, fuel consumption, and lift capabilities of both aircraft, optimization analysis determined that the air bridge could support a distance of 110 nautical miles. This distance required a total of "732 sorties (397 for the assault forces, 205 for the combat trains, and 130 for the MCSSD)."[44] The available MV-22s and CH-53s were able to conduct a total of 749 sorties in a two day period (the study removed 14% to conduct MEDEVAC type missions), which left 17 aircraft available for logistics.[45]

The Mission Area Analysis Operational Report indicated that the capability exists to employ ground forces and sustain them up to a flight distance of 110 nautical miles from the afloat launching platform. However, the surface platforms would most likely operate initially from 15 to 25 nautical miles from the shoreline. Additionally, a distance of 9 to 10 nautical miles would probably be used to conduct necessary flight maneuvers during the approach to the objective. Thus, this study assumes an operational reach of the Ship-to-Objective Maneuver of 80 nautical miles. For smaller quantities of forces, such as reconnaissance or special operations forces, this range would increase due to the decrease in lift requirements (heavy lift equipment). Although technological advances may

increase this distance, these ranges may suffice for 70% of the operations since a 1997

United Nations report states that about 60% of the world's population live within 62

miles from the coastline.[46]

One of the insights from the Marine Corps Combat Development Command Mission

Area Analysis is the impact of lift, both in the weight and the method of transport

(interior and exterior loading). The weight not only dictates the type of aircraft, but also

impacts fuel consumption. As for the method of transport, it dictates the speed in which

the naval rotary aircraft can fly which impacts the number of sorties. Currently, the Navy

and Marine Corps are developing this capability; however, different opinions of its

utilization are surfacing as the Sea Basing Joint Integrating Concept is being considered

in the Joint Staff development process. In particular, what does this concept mean

regarding the employment of Army units?

Service Insights on Sea Basing

The January 30, 2006 National Defense News article "Naval 'Sea Base' Supporters

Seek to Prove Worth to Army" surfaces the many questions surrounding the development

of sea basing by both service analysts and service leadership.[47] Although not stated in the

article, developing military capabilities for an uncertain global security environment will

inevitably bring about concerns over equities as well as justification for the program

itself. Although these insights diverge in many cases, they are focused on the

development of a capable and viable 21st century United States military.

In this National Defense News article, Robert Work, a senior naval analyst for the

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, states that "Sea basing as a concept is

very, very good."[48] However, he believes that sea basing "just needs to be scrubbed much more carefully with an eye toward joint payoff."[49] Furthermore, according to the article, he believes that the concept of sea basing changed when it was selected as the "answer to the Pentagon's demands for rapid-reaction forces that can deploy to a major combat zone in 10 days and defeat an enemy in 30 days."[50] As for the Marine Corps, the article says that Major General Gordon Nash, director of the Navy's expeditionary warfare division, believes that sea basing will help address access issues and that sea basing is "a significant improvement of where we are today."[51]

From an Army perspective, the article states that Colonel Chels Chae, Chief of Joint and Army Concepts at the service's Training and Doctrine Command believes that Navy "ships have served as a base of operations for the Army before" on an "ad hoc and small scale."[52] Furthermore, Colonel Chae is quoted "What we are talking about in terms of sea basing is being able to project forces that are lethal, survivable and mobile, and pose a credible threat to our adversary when they are on the ground."[53] With respect to the Army integration to date in sea basing, the article quotes Vice Admiral McCarthy, "We're beginning to get appreciation for what it would take to float an Army brigade. Because of our close relationship with the Marine Corps, we have a very clear understanding of what it would take to support the Marines. We have less clear understanding of what it would take to support the Army."[54] Additionally, the article states that Vice Admiral McCarthy believes that the real challenge to incorporate the Army will be the lift required for the heavy equipment.[55]

Overall, this article shows the increase of joint discussions involved with the development of sea basing. In the beginning, sea basing was a concept co-developed

between the Navy and Marine Corps; however, it is now a global access solution in which joint integration and overall utilization are being discussed. These questions and concerns necessitate the analysis of sea basing in a *holistic* approach starting with national strategic guidance.

Chapter 3

Strategic Guidance

Strategy is "the science and art of employing the political, economic, psychological, and military forces of a nation or group of nations to afford the maximum support to adopted policies in peace and war"[56] The elements of political, economic, psychological and military forces are the elements of national power. The United States' strategy is established by the President in the National Security Strategy. In the current 2002 National Security Strategy, the President delineates the national objectives (ends), courses of action (ways) and resources (means) necessary to ensure American national interests.[57] Along with diplomatic, information, and economic, the military is one of the elements of national power (means). The Secretary of Defense extracts the guidance within the ends and means of the National Security Strategy that pertain to the military to formulate a National Defense Strategy. From the National Defense Strategy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff establishes a National Military Strategy. An understanding of the relationship between these strategies is important to assess the applicability of sea basing within the national strategy.

The National Defense Strategy establishes "a set of overarching defense objectives that guide the Department's security activities and provide direction for the National Military Strategy."[58] In other words, the National Defense Strategy has more of a focus

on how to integrate with the other elements of national power (economic, informational, and diplomatic) and support national strategy. Whereas the National Military Strategy is focused on the implementation of the overarching defense strategy. For the purpose of clarity, this report will refer to the elements of the National Defense Strategy in terms of *objectives, courses of action, and resources* and the elements of the National Military Strategy in terms of *ends, ways, and means.* Along with the security environment, the National Defense Strategy also provides implementation guidance which shapes the National Military Strategy. With an understanding of the *objectives* and security environment, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff incorporates the implementation guidance to formulate a National Military Strategy where the *ends* and the *ways* support the *courses of action* and *resources* of the National Defense Strategy, respectively.[59] Thus, an assessment of sea basing applicability requires an understanding of both the 2004 National Military Strategy and the 2005 National Defense Strategy.

National Defense Strategy

As with all national strategies, the 2005 National Defense Strategy is heavily influenced by the security environment. Within the Department of Defense, the global security environment is considered to be "extremely fluid, with continually changing coalitions, alliances, partnerships, and new (both national and transnational) threats constantly appearing and disappearing."[60] Essentially, this description of a security environment emphasizes uncertainty and frames its characterization within the 2005 National Defense Strategy. In the defense strategy, the security environment is

characterized by four method challenges: irregular, catastrophic, disruptive, and

traditional. These challenges are portrayed in figure 1.

Strategic Context: Four Challenges

Higher ↑

Irregular
Challenges arising from the adoption or employment of unconventional methods by non-state and state actors to counter stronger state opponents – terrorisms, insurgency, civil war, etc.

Catastrophic
Challenges involving the surreptitious acquisition, possession, and possible terrorist or rogue employment of WMD or methods producing WMD-like effects.

Vulnerability

Lower ←   Higher →

Traditional
Challenges posed largely by states employing legacy and advanced military capabilities and recognizable military forces, in long-established, well-known forms of military competition and conflict.

Disruptive
Future challenges emanating from competitors developing, possessing, and employing breakthrough technological capabilities intended to supplant our advantages in particular operational domains.

Lower ↓

Likelihood
No hard boundaries distinguishing one category from another.

Figure 1: Security Environment Strategic Challenges [61]

Examples of these four challenges would be terrorism or an insurgency, a rogue nation

using a Weapon of Mass Destruction against the United States, the development of a

capability that renders a previous United States military advantage obsolete, and another

nation waging conventional war against the United States, respectively.[62] These

descriptions of global security environment forces the Department of Defense to prepare

for all possible conflicts and inevitably manage risks while either developing new or

maintaining current capabilities in order to accomplish national objectives.

The objectives of the 2005 National Defense Strategy are to "secure the United

States from direct attack …secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action

…strengthen alliances and partnerships … and establish favorable security conditions."[63]

These objectives focus on getting rid of the problem before the commencement of an attack against the United States. In fact, they are linked together in order to create a layered defense that facilitates engagements as far as possible from the United States. From a cursory view, sea basing is one of the tools that will be used to accomplish each of these four objectives. However, to be effective, sea basing must support the National Defense Strategy.

In order to accomplish the United States defense objectives, the 2005 National Defense Strategy identifies courses of action through four key activities to focus efforts which are "assure allies and friends … dissuade potential adversaries … deter aggression and counter coercion … and defeat adversaries."[64] Although today's threat is global, in general the strategy has not changed. During the Cold War, the United States understood that an objective to stop the spread of communism required support of allies and friends who needed reassurance of American commitment. Additionally, the United States continues to develop a credible military capability that limits the enemy's ability to achieve success (dissuade), demonstrate the ability to substantially retaliate in order to prevent an attack (deter), and defeat the enemy if a conflict were to arise.[65] In order to accomplish these courses of action the military's resources must be "sized, shaped and postured to support global operations."[66]

From a force planning point of view, the Secretary of Defense provides implementation guidelines that not only influences the National Military Strategy, but also significantly impacts the development of new concepts, such as sea basing. The implementation guidelines delineated in the National Defense Strategy includes active, layered defense; continuous transformation; capabilities based approach to defense

planning; and managing risks.[67] These guidelines are linked together in an attempt to

effectively prepare for future threats while the military is actively involved in the Global

War on Terrorism (GWoT). For an *active layered defense*, capabilities are required to

influence each of the potential adversary's decision points and to demonstrate the United

States' commitment to American friends and allies. For example, a decision point for a

potential adversary would include whether to commence hostilities against a neighboring

nation. A demonstration of United States' resolve may prevent that action. From an

acquisition stand point, the Defense Department will stress *transformation* in order to

strengthen "advantages and reduce vulnerabilities" using a capabilities based approach to

defense planning which focuses on potential challenges vice those posed by specific

adversaries. This approach will "drive a top-down, competitive process" within the

Defense Department where the Secretary of Defense and joint force commanders will

balance or manage risks.[68]

    The National Defense Strategy sets the overarching environment for the strategic

planning and posture of the military. New capabilities and concepts are developed within

a competitive process and as such are born with links directly to the defense strategy.

Within this type of system, difficulty lies in the decision as to the extent of a new

capability or concept. In order to maximize the military's ability to meet objectives

within the defense budget's fiscal constraints, tradeoffs must be correctly identified and

assessed. This is particularly important for emerging concepts, especially when the

Defense Department is in the process of a fundamental reorganization and transformation

to address a new security environment while simultaneously conducting combat

operations. One of the largest revolutionary changes within the Department of Defense is

focused on optimizing fewer resources, yet responding to global objectives; thus the

establishment of a new Global Defense Posture. Sea basing is directly linked and is part

of the Global Defense Posture, but the extent to which it is involved is yet to be

determined. For this reason, an understanding of the Global Defense Posture is essential.

Global Defense Posture

In August 2004, the president "announced the most comprehensive restructuring of

U.S. military forces overseas since the end of the Korean War."[69] His comments

included,

> Over the coming decade, we will deploy a more agile and more flexible
> force, which means that more of our troops will be stationed and deployed
> from here at home. We will move some of our troops and capabilities to
> new locations, so they can surge quickly to deal with unexpected threats.
> We'll take advantage of 21st century military technologies to rapidly
> deploy increased combat power. The new plan will help us fight and win
> these wars of the 21st century. It will strengthen our alliances around the
> world, while we build new partnerships to better preserve the peace.[70]

In essence, most of the forward deployed forces will return and become based in the

United States while "more flexible and rapidly deployable" forces will be strategically

forward deployed.[71] From this posture, military forces will be globally sourced. The

responsive forward deployed forces will be utilized as a deterrent. In a time of crisis,

they will be the first on the scene to stop the escalation and if necessary, enable the rapid

deployment of reinforcement forces based in CONUS. The goals of the Global Defense

Plan are to "expand U.S. defense relationships with allies and build new partnerships …

develop flexibility to contend with uncertainty … provide for both a regional and global

forward presence … enable rapid power projection … and focus on capabilities instead of

numbers."[72] While the former defense posture could support some of these goals, some

of the underlining principles provide insight into the future deployment and employment of the military in the 21st century.

First, forward presence will be "tailored to optimally balance" the United States "21st century military requirements" along with allied relationships and "impact of a U.S. presence on host nations."[73] Second, with a strategy based on an uncertain security environment, a globally sourced response affords flexible response options, doing more with less. Finally, forward deployed forces will maintain relationships and interactions yet stay ready to quickly surge to global requirements.[74] Essentially, this posture is designed to enrich United States "ties with our defense partners around the world – making it easier for us to cooperate, lightening our footprint, eliminating unnecessary irritations," and forming a partnership with allies that will assist in the modernization of the military.[75] With this in mind, the posture will maintain established forward bases, establish cooperative security locations as ready made forward operating bases (unmanned, yet periodically maintained), and enable a "more joint approach to pre-positioned equipment and stocks that reflects the new requirements for operational flexibility."[76] The development of sea basing is inherently linked to the new Global Defense Posture as an access enabler in which the Navy and Marine Corps are pursuing as part of a naval power projection capability. The extent in which the Army will integrate into the sea basing concept is currently being assessed and a focus of this research.

National Military Strategy

   With an understanding of the global security environment, overarching defense

objectives, employment guidelines, and direction of the defense posture in the 21st

century, the focus delineated in the 2004 National Military Strategy provides further

insight toward an assessment of the value of future sea basing capabilities.[77] Currently,

the Sea Basing Joint Integrating Concept is being vetted by the Services and Joint Staff

within the context of Joint Operating Concepts. These Joint Operating Concepts are

coordinated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and within the context of the

National Military Strategy.

   The ends (objectives) of the 2004 National Military Strategy are "to protect the United

States against external attacks and aggression, prevent conflict and surprise attack and

prevail against adversaries."[78] While these ends fully support the 2005 National Defense

Strategy, they are in a way unbound and respond to an uncertain security environment.

The ways (courses of action) within the National Military Strategy describe the manner in

which the military will develop capabilities which support the National Defense Strategy.

   In the current National Military Strategy, the development of capabilities will be

achieved through integrated force employment concepts which are contained within the

Joint Operating Concepts, Joint Functional Concepts, and Joint Integrating Concepts.

Each of these concepts is staffed through the services. The two prevalent themes in the

2004 National Military Strategy that influence these joint concepts are jointness and

transformation. The desired joint force attributes are "functions and capabilities focused

toward a unified purpose … rapidly deployable, employable and sustainable throughout

the global battlespace … linked and synchronized in time and purpose … integrated

capabilities operating in a joint manner at lower echelons … prepared to quickly respond with the appropriate capabilities mix … better-informed decisions implemented faster than an adversary can react … and destroy an adversary and/or his systems in all conditions.[79] More precisely they are integrated, expeditionary, networked, decentralized, adaptable, enable decision superiority, and lethal.

Does Sea Basing Support National Guidance?

   Common threads are present throughout the national strategy documents that can be used to assess the sea basing concept. The common threads are an uncertain global security environment (requiring a capability based approach to acquisition), access assurance (forward presence, globally sourced), modular rapid response (capable of escalating to major combat operations), joint integration, and transformation. Conceptually, sea basing meets these common threads within the national guidance.

   Sea basing focuses on using the 75% of the earth which belongs to no country and hence can be used as a place from which to operate without regard to host nation permission due to Freedom of Navigation in International waters. With the number of permanent forward land operating bases diminishing, sea basing is able to fill a niche capability for the Department of Defense. The concept also addresses, at least as much as any capability can, an uncertain global security environment. In many ways, sea basing already has fulfilled the newly identified anti-access capability gap in the globalization era of the 21st century in an *ad hoc* manner in Haiti, Operation Enduring Freedom, the Horn of Africa, and even for crisis response along the Gulf Coast after Hurricane Katrina.

However, the questions are, what is the full extent to which sea basing should be developed? Is the concept transformational? How should the concept be integrated between the services? Particularly during the present fiscally austere, wartime conditions, these are some of the most important questions that must be answered. Another previous study was conducted in an attempt to answer some of these questions. The 2003 Defense Science Board Task Force's independent study on sea basing provides insight into the applicability and importance of the emerging naval sea basing concept.

2003 Defense Science Board Task Force on Sea Basing

In 2003, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics requested that the Defense Science board establish a task force "to assess how sea basing of expeditionary forces can best serve the nation's defense needs."[80] The August 2003 Defense Science Board Task Force on Sea Basing focused "on the ship-to-objective-maneuver role of the seabase," believing that this role was the most transformational.[81] One of the outcomes from the task force was a conclusion that sea basing "represents a critical future national military capability for the United States" by helping "to assure access."[82] In line with the current 2005 National Defense Strategy, the task force determined that "the political reality of the post-Cold War era is that U.S. allies are less dependent on the United States for their security than during the days of the Soviet Union. In fact, in the current war on terrorism, the United States has become more dependent on allies and friends for intelligence and participation in addressing a global, distributed threat than it ever was in the Cold War."[83] As evidence of the increasing access difficulties, the 2003 Defense Science Board Task Force cited examples of access

refusals in recent history. In 1973, most of the European NATO allies "denied the United States basing and overflight rights in aerial efforts to re-supply Israel in the midst of that nation's desperate fight for survival during the Yom Kippur War."[84] Twenty three years later, "both Turkey and Saudi Arabia denied the United States the use of their bases to respond to Iraqi attacks on the Kurds."[85] Also, "despite the expenditure of vast resources in building up the infrastructure of land bases in the Middle East, the United States discovered that many of its Arab Allies refused the use of that infrastructure for combat aircraft participating in the campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan."[86]

The Defense Science Board Task Force on Sea Basing illustrates that sea basing is a critical capability that is different from the established amphibious operations, it never states in the final report that sea basing is *transformational*. However, the task force does assess sea basing as a joint capability and admits that there are several established joint definitions. They formally concludes that the Army and Air Force must fully participate in the development of sea basing,[87] the body of the report elaborates on sea basing in terms of *jointness*. Regarding sea basing, the task force concluded that "jointness means four things:

- The ability of the seabase to serve as the joint force commander's location[88]
- Its ability to serve as a dynamic base of operations for forces of all Services
- Its ability to handle the logistics of all four Services plus special operations forces
- Its ability to support and sustain operations from the sea of all four Services"[89]

In essence, according to the Defense Science Board Task Force, sea basing should mean everything to every service.

Although this may be true, a fiscally constrained environment dictates choices concerning the amount and type of Service integration of sea basing. With this in mind, a review of established guidance from the Office of Force Transformation is first necessary to determine whether sea basing is both *transformational* and *joint*.

Chapter 4

Joint Transformation

Consistent with the 2005 National Military Strategy, the Department of Defense is focusing equipment and concept development and spending on the transformation of the military. In the 2006 defense budget request for $419.3 billion, money that is not designated toward the ongoing war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan is mainly focused on fundamental changes in the overall structure of the military. These changes will support the new Global Defense Posture with more rapidly deployable, expeditionary forces. Of particular note, the budget request also targets the acquisition of Air Force C-17s [90] which are essential to the mobility of the Army's emerging expeditionary forces. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army used the C-17 extensively when Turkey refused access. This utilization of aircraft during Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrated a proven capability to fill the Army's requirement to rapidly deploy its modular forces.[91] In a capabilities based approach to defense planning, the purchase of C-17s may fill the necessary transportation requirement and negate any possible gap for sea basing to fill in terms of Army units.

What is Transformation?

With such an emphasis on transformation within the budget decision process, each new program is being developed to meet the requirements set forth in the transformation guidance. These transformational changes are part of "a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation's advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world."[92] In order to define the process that will guide the military structure changes, the 2003 Transformation Planning Guidance delineates four pillars along with six operational goals established from the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.[93]

The four pillars of this fundamental military shift are strengthening joint operations, exploiting United States intelligence advantages, experimenting in support of new warfighting concepts, and developing transformational capabilities.[94] Although each of these pillars are important, the overall theme that they represent is a calculated approach that includes the development, experimentation, and formalization of Joint Operating Concepts that focus on interoperability in order to capitalize on the intelligence capabilities of the United States. The Joint Operating Concepts are developed and maintained by the Joint Staff with Service input with Service transformation efforts being formalized in their respective roadmaps. Thus, transformation efforts are being developed within the Joint Staff and Services.

Sea basing development is no exception. As discussed earlier, a Sea Basing Joint Integrating Concept is being vetted among each of the Services. A Joint Integrating

Concept (JIC) is developed from broader focused Joint Functional Concepts (JFC) which originates from Joint Operating Concepts (JOC). While all three of these documents are written for "8-20 years in the future"[95], Joint Operating Concepts "describe how a joint force commander … is expected to conduct operations within a military campaign …focuses on the associated broad military capabilities."[96] Joint Functional Concepts "describe how the joint force … will perform an enduring military function across the full range of military operations."[97] As for Joint Integrating Concepts, they are "an operational-level description of how a joint force commander … will perform a specific operation or function derived from a JOC and/or a JFC."[98] Basically these concepts form the foundation for the defense planning in the future. Additionally, sea basing is discussed and planned in the Naval Transformation Roadmap. As delineated in the roadmap guidance, "a central element of transforming our force is interoperability - the ability to bring all relevant information and assets to bear in a timely, coherent manner."[99]

These pillars are designed in part to fulfill the six intermediate operational goals identified in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review that in turn will equip the military with capabilities better suited for the implementation of the National Defense Strategy. These goals are "protecting critical bases of operations … projecting and sustaining U.S. forces in distant anti-access or area-denial environments and defeating anti-access threats … denying enemies sanctuary through persistent surveillance, tracking and rapid engagement with high-volume precision strikes … assuring information systems in the face of attack and conducting effective and discriminate offensive information operations … enhancing the capability and survivability of space systems and supporting infrastructure … and leveraging information technology and innovative concepts to

develop an interoperable, joint C4ISR architecture and capability that includes a tailorable joint operational picture."[100] As expected, the Sea Basing Joint Integrating Concept discusses and relates the importance of sea basing to each of these operational goals.

The focus of these goals is on protection, access flexibility, and rapid response options in a new era of globalization where information is power and the security environment is identified as *uncertain* in the 2005 National Defense Strategy. Conceptually, sea basing appears to be a natural fit within the transformation guidance. A central theme of sea basing is the logistical support of up to two expeditionary brigades from the sea which affords inherent protection, anti-access and forward basing flexibility, and the ability to project expeditionary ground forces.

While sea basing conceptually meets the guidance of both the strategic and transformational guidance, it is being developed as an enabling capability that applies throughout the full range of military operations. The culture of the military lends to the development of capabilities designed to defeat more traditional worst case scenarios. Conceptually, developing concepts and capabilities in this manner is in a way contradictory to transformation since an essential element of the military's fundamental shift hinges on changing its culture.[101] For the purpose of thoroughness, this study will address the applicability of sea basing in both major combat operations and lesser contingencies. However, it will consider a different approach to strategy and a qualitative assessment of the security environment to further analyze the importance of sea basing.

Major Combat Operations

To assess the necessity of sea basing for future major combat operations, history can provide lessons learned. World War II, the Korean War, Operation Desert Storm, and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) are all examples of major combat operations which provide different insights into the necessity of sea basing. In World War II, amphibious operations were essential in the success of both the Normandy landings in the Atlantic Theater and the island hopping campaign in the Pacific Theater. Since both of these theater operations provide different lessons learned that directly relate to sea basing, they are addressed separately. However, prior to examining these lessons learned it is important to note that prior to World War II, the integration of land, air, and sea operations to support amphibious operations was formalized in doctrine. Additionally, it is important to note that in 2006, over 60 years after the initial development of the Higgins amphibious landing craft used in World War II, the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff used its creation as an example illustrating the necessity to "increase capabilities rather than to respond to any single threat."[102] Both of these developments changed the way the military would fight and in essence were truly transformational.

The Allied forces did not have access to continental Europe in World War II. Thus, the Allies decided that an amphibious assault was necessary to assist the Soviet advances from the east. Using the newly established amphibious doctrine that was developed by the Marine Corps, the allied forces used land, air, and sea integration to mass effects ashore during the landing. Operation Overlord included amphibious landings with concurrent insertions of airborne forces behind enemy beach fortifications in order to

disrupt enemy reinforcements and interdict their lines of communication.[103]

Additionally, the ground forces, mainly Army soldiers, were pre-staged and constituted in Great Britain prior to insertion via amphibious operations.

These events are important to the assessment of sea basing because they illustrate both its inherent joint force enabling capability and some insight into joint force integration. Without access to either a Sea Port of Debarkation (SPOD) or Air Port of Debarkation (APOD), forces must flow in a matter that supports immediate combat operations during insertion. Two concepts existed in the early 1940's and today that enable forces to accomplish Joint Forcible Entry Operations. First, troops can flow via amphibious operations and airborne operations. However, in World War II, the forces had to be pre-staged in Great Britain due to the operational reach considerations. The Sea Basing Concept of Operations also depicts using a *safe* forward access area for the flow of forces to the maritime base. In Normandy, both were used and proved to be quite effective in an integrated and force multiplying effort. Second, the particular ground force capabilities needed to accomplish the landing were resident in both the Marine Corps and the Army. The primary reason that the ground forces used in the amphibious landing consisted mainly of Army units was due to Soldier quantity. In the case of sea basing, only two brigades are available to directly utilize the capabilities. In an operation that only involves two brigades, such as seizing an SPOD/APOD or lesser contingencies the Service choice for participation becomes more about inherent capabilities.

In the Pacific Theater, the island hopping campaign was a necessity. The Japanese expanded into the islands of the Pacific which created a buffer. This buffer restricted United States access to bases within striking distance of Japan. The main reasons that

drove the requirement for United States forward basing were logistics and air support. Two concurrent operations which are particularly pertinent to this research were the amphibious assaults against the Makin Atoll and Tarawa. Both of these assaults were supported by air and naval forces.

The ground forces for the Makin Atoll were the Army's 27th Division. Geographically, the Atoll is 'U-shaped' and forms a bay or lagoon. The plan consisted of two landings. The ground forces would approach the same general portion of the Atoll from opposite directions. The first landing approached the beach from the ocean or outside of the 'U-shaped' island. Two hours later, a second landing arrived via the lagoon side. Command and control was an issue as the 27th Division had trouble controlling the synchronization of the two landings. The ocean approach proved to be uneventful whereas the lagoon assault was problematic. First, the depth of the water in the lagoon caused the landing craft to run aground making the ground forces wade a considerable distance prior to reaching the beach. Additionally, the enemy had a vote and did the opposite of the Allied expectations. They focused their defenses against the lagoon approach forces. Although the enemy combat forces on the island numbered considerably less than Tarawa, the amount of time to seize the island was the same for both operations.[104]

On Tarawa, the 2nd Marine Division devised a simple plan that consisted of a single assault. Although the enemy was entrenched in heavy fortifications and the Allied forces took considerable losses, the island was seized rapidly in comparison to the Makin Atoll.[105]

Several insights gleaned from these historical assaults concerned the importance of command and control, flexibility, and the oceanographic terrain. Sea basing fully supports joint command and control capabilities as well as flexibility in the type of assault vehicles. This enables a Joint Task Force Commander to effectively adapt to enemy decisions and also negate some of the difficulties associated with shallow approaches. Additionally, if the Allies would have had current Air Force tanker capabilities, the Air Force, along with naval aircraft carriers, could have supported air operations necessary throughout the Pacific. As a result, the integration of current airborne assault capabilities and emerging sea basing sustained naval power projection would have enabled a bypass of most of the Pacific islands by securing an APOD and SPOD for the necessary flow of combat power. Sea basing will be able to deliver and support an entire Marine Expeditionary Brigade which is more than enough to seize an SPOD or APOD. Under current plans, the emerging modular Army Brigade Combat Teams are being configured to be employed using Air Force airlift while most of the logistics support will arrive via sealift as it did in the European Theater of operations during World War II.

The next major combat operation to be considered is the Korean War. In 1950, General MacArthur decided to utilize what the Marine Corps now refer to as Operational Maneuver from the Sea to position landing forces behind enemy lines. The General's Marine Corps amphibious force landed at Inchon and proceeded to Seoul. These forces received little resistance and caused the North Korean Army to retreat to the North. Although this was an extremely successful operation, it was risky. The effects of tides and currents at Inchon made a landing only possible along a single channel during a three

to four day period each month.[106] This made the landing site and time extremely predictable and susceptible to enemy defenses.   Sea basing capabilities along with the sustainable Ship to Objective Maneuver Concept would remove many of the risks involved in a similar operation in the future by providing flexible landing options through emerging vertical and seaborne lift capabilities. The forces that can be supported by sea basing were comparable to those utilized during the actual amphibious assault. Had we had sea basing then, North Koreans would have been at risk for attack along the entire coastline.

It is important to note in Operation Desert Storm, almost 50 years later that only the Marines were inserted via the sea since access authority was obtained for the insertion and build-up of Army ground forces from Saudi Arabia; such a base is not guaranteed in future operations. Three key insights affecting sea basing can be derived from this campaign. First, the Marine Corps forces were utilized as a deception prior to the commencement of ground operations. While Army forces were conducting a flanking maneuver within Saudi Arabia, the Marine Amphibious Force demonstrated the intent to land forces in Kuwait. This caused the Iraqi forces to remain in place and enabled the coalition joint force to envelop the enemy. Projected sea basing capabilities also could successfully deceive an enemy while providing greater flexibility for the insertion of Marines.

Second, mines were an issue in the Northern Arabian Gulf. Naval forces had to clear routes in order to introduce both forces and logistics into the theater. Of the logistics required, 95% arrived via sea lift.[107] This means that even with sea basing mine warfare is important and a factor in the littorals; however, the vertical lift capabilities of the sea

base would enable the joint force to sustain up to a brigade size force that could seize and set up a necessary SPOD while mine clearance is achieved.

Finally, Operation Desert Storm called for a ground force that far exceeded the size that can be delivered and sustained through sea basing. With this in mind, sea basing provides an enabling capability; however, it cannot be utilized to support the delivery and sustainment of all the associated ground forces needed in a major combat operation.

Operation Iraqi Freedom provides additional study insights and reinforces thoughts or lessons learned from previously discussed operations. First, the ground forces used during the campaign in March 2003 were considerably larger than the two brigades that a sea base can sustain. In this operation, the main ground forces were pre-staged to the south of Iraq in Kuwait and consisted of forces from the Marine Corps and the Army. With the support of air power, these forces proceeded north and seized the Iraq capital city of Bagdad. In both the north and the west of Iraq, Special Forces were inserted via airlift in order to secure the oil fields in the north and protect against missile launches in the west. Originally, planning included the use of the 4th Infantry Division in the north. This became problematic when Turkey refused access rights and caused the Combatant Commander to deploy airborne forces in the north.

This operation is of particular interest to sea basing since it shows that major combat operations against a country like Iraq require more forces than a sea base can support; having it also reinforces the issue of access rights for future campaigns. If Kuwait would have refused basing rights instead of Turkey, forceable entry operations would have been required as part of the campaign. Sea basing is a concept made for this type of mission. With the support of joint air power, two brigades could seize key lodgements which

could be utilized to establish the ground forces and logistics necessary for success and give the United States diplomatic and military flexibility. With a majority of logistics necessary for this operation coming via the sea, establishing and maintaining an SPOD is critical to success. From the 2004 U.S. TRANSCOM Annual Command Report, "sealift accounted for approximately 84 percent of the Operation Iraqi Freedom cargo" between January and June 2004.[108]

Additionally, the fact that Turkey did not make its decision until just prior to the commencement of operations demonstrates that the access can not be assumed and the military needs to maintain flexibility to react. Yet, as with any combat operation, rehearsals are extremely important. This demonstrates the importance of peacetime exercises and previously established command relationships. The Marine Corps deploys, exercises, and plans alongside the naval assets that will make up the sea base. This is similar to the exercise and planning associated with Army airborne forces and the Air Force mobility assets. Rehearsals that are built into daily operations inherently facilitate more expeditious readiness to execute such a change to an operation, possibly in concert with an airborne assault. This type of flexible capability is a powerful diplomatic and military enabling tool. Unlike the current amphibious operations, initial operations do not totally depend on shoreline seizure and reconstitution for success. With sea basing, the shoreline is no longer a seam in the operation and the opposition cannot count on single access points for defensive measures.

Lastly, Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrated the necessity for the United States military to develop a credibly stability operation capability. Although sea basing does

not have the operational reach to support stability operations throughout Iraq directly

from the sea, it is an enabling rapid response capability that supports that type of mission.

<u>Contingency Operations</u>

Operation Just Cause (December 20, 1989 – January 11, 1990) in Panama is an

example of a contingency operation that lends itself as a case study for sea basing. In

1989, President Noriega was in charge of Panama. The United States desired a regime

change[109] to stabilize the country and exercise treaty rights associated with the Panama

Canal. In order to accomplish this operation, the main forces were comprised of the

Army airborne forces with the Air Force airlift and gun ships for support.[110] Panama is

located close enough to the United States that the forces could deploy directly from

America to combat. Additional forces consisted of Sailors and Marines forward stationed

in Panama.[111]

Overall, Operation Just Cause was determined to be an extremely successful joint

operation. Leveraging the close working relationship between the Air Force and Army

airborne forces, the United States was able to react quickly to the changing circumstances

in Panama. A preponderance of the objectives was successfully completed by Army

ground forces. Their synchronized efforts prevented counter offenses before they had an

opportunity to take place. The Marines and Sailors were utilized to safeguard the

American citizens on the base; however, these contributions were not driven by the

capabilities inherent in the Marine Corps and Navy; they were chosen due to their

availability in Panama. Thus, the force multiplying effect of joint operations came from

the integration of the Army and the Air Force. The close and inherent integrated

relationship maintained between the Air Force and Army airborne forces proved to be an integral factor in the success of the operation and made the limited rehearsals more effective.

However, if the location of the operation was further away, forward basing access would have been more essential in the planning and execution of the operation. Sea basing could reduce some of the forward access requirements. In the case of Panama, ground forces employed within the emerging sea basing construct, could have significantly contributed to Operation Just Cause. At its narrowest point the isthmus of Panama "is barely fifty miles wide"[112] and the canal is 52 miles long and within the operational reach of the sea basing concept.[113] Conceivably, two brigades could have performed some of the time critical objectives. An example of a mission that could have been primarily assigned to sea based forces would be securing lodgment nodes in support of deploying forces. Additionally, although the two brigades could not have accomplished all of the missions, their ability to conduct a variety of missions makes the sea based force a credible reserve force. Since these forces would be operating within the area of operations, the minimal time and distance to objective would support rapid response. If nothing else, a sea based force could have been used to gain flexibility in the operation, since one of the key factors in the success of Operation Just Cause was the availability of all planned airlift requirements. If any of the airlift assets would have experienced problems, the risk would have increased dramatically due to the lack of alternative backup options.

These different assessments of historical operations provide insight; however, they do not fully address how to effectively integrate the capabilities that sea basing brings to

bear. In order to more fully gain a perspective of optimal integration of sea basing in joint operations, further exploration of joint definitions and concepts of joint operation fundamentals is necessary.

Joint Operation Fundamentals

One of the main themes underlining the 2004 National Military Strategy is *jointness*. According to the Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, the term joint "connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate."[114] Similarly, the definitions of a joint base and joint force use terminology that differentiates between Services and Military Departments. However, in the case of joint amphibious operation, it is defined as "an amphibious operation conducted by significant elements of two or more Services."[115] The importance of these definitions resides in the characterization of the Marine Corps as a Service within the Department of the Navy. Of particular note, the definition that does not follow a more parochial theme is joint amphibious operation. It focuses on core competencies of the Marine Corps in conjunction with the Navy which illuminates the importance of leveraging core competencies to achieve optimum effectiveness.

Although these definitions are intended to force joint integration, they are contradictory to the other main theme of *transformation* in the National Military Strategy. Basing joint operations and capabilities solely on the number of military departments is not consistent with a true capability based approach to defense planning which as

previously discussed is part of the intended culture change within the military. A more consistent approach focuses on the integration of capabilities at the operational level.

Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, considers that the power of *jointness* is achieved through the "integrated and synchronized application of all appropriate capabilities."[116] Essentially, "Joint warfare is team warfare."[117] Overall, the power of *jointness* lies in "the synergy that results from the integration and synchronization of the action of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces over time and space assists the JFC to assail important adversary vulnerabilities while presenting no friendly seams or vulnerabilities for the adversary to exploit."[118] In order to achieve maximum competition and innovation between all Services, optimize core Service competencies, and effectively utilize a capabilities based approach to defense planning, joint operations and concepts should be along more of an operational integration theme. This is truly a culture change for the Department of Defense that should be followed, moving away from a more parochial approach. However, how much joint integration is optimum in a fiscally constrained environment?

A scalable integration approach enables the maximum participation of all the Services along with their inherent core competencies. In many ways the Air Force's relationship with the Army is similar to the Navy's relationship with the Marine Corps. Even within the Army's transformation roadmap, the rapid deployment of its modular forces is integrated with Air Force capabilities. Additionally, while the Marine Corps emphasizes sea borne expeditionary power projection, they do not focus on expeditionary airborne operations. A possible integration solution would consist of the synchronous insertion of

the Army airborne forces with Marine Corps expeditionary forces being employed and sustained via emerging sea basing capabilities.

Analysis presented to this point demonstrates that sea basing is an essential capability for the 21st century that supports the 2005 National Defense Strategy, the National Defense Posture, and the 2004 National Military Strategy. Sea basing follows the transformational guidance and supports the additional 2004 National Military Strategy and 2005 National Defense Strategy common threads of access assurance (forward presence, globally sourced), modular rapid response (capable of escalating to major combat operations), and joint integration. However, most of the emerging concepts fall into the same category and support the strategy. In an uncertain security environment a capabilities based approach to defense planning can become a *blank check* approach. Capability gaps can be identified using the most dangerous threat vice the most expected or even likely. In many ways, this approach lends to the development of capabilities focused in the traditional threat quadrant instead of assuming risk within this quadrant. In order to truly transform and develop concepts necessary to meet the 2005 National Defense Strategy, the decision making process needs a more systematic or holistic approach to strategy. Strategy must be addressed within a complete system or model that incorporates a qualitative security environment assessment. This will result in better informed inputs to the force planning decisions. In essence, the military must rethink strategy and change its culture.

Chapter 5

Rethinking Strategy and Force Planning

The Department of Defense Force Planning process is currently based on many different approaches. In an attempt to cover all possible angles, the Department of Defense uses top-down, bottom-up, scenario, core competencies and missions, capabilities based, technology and fiscal approaches concurrently to make Force Planning decisions.[119] For example, the Defense Department's Quadrennial Defense Review employs a *top-down* approach which focuses on the National Security Strategy. In contrast the ongoing Global War on Terrorism is causing the United States to also use a *bottom-up* approach. This approach focuses on existing capabilities and looks to facilitate changes in the form of modernization. An example of this type of approach is the use of the existing Navy carriers as part of the base line for Force Planning. To facilitate the top-down and bottom-up approach, the Defense Department uses scenarios in the form of campaign analyses that provide information on capability gaps which forms the foundation of a capabilities based approach to defense planning.

Additionally, using one of the six operational goals from the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, a technology approach is utilized that calls for the interoperability of capabilities that will capitalize on the United States intelligence gathering advantages. Finally, budgets are developed and planned five years in advance, yet fiscal constraints

dictate late breaking changes which confirm a fiscal approach. All of these approaches are valid and have strengths and weaknesses. However, a combination of all of the different approaches can lead to maximum effectiveness, total disaster or somewhere in between since the sum of the strengths or weaknesses is unknown and can change from case to case.

A different approach to Strategy and Force Planning

In an article titled "The Art of Strategy and Force Planning," by Henry C. Bartlett, G. Paul Holman, Jr., and Timothy E. Somes, a simple model is introduced that enables a force planner to make strategic decisions based on the interaction of competing variables. Figure 1 depicts the *Bartlett Model*. As illustrated, the model identifies goals (ends), strategy, resource constraints, tools (means), risk, and security environment as the key variables. Although Bartlett refers to strategy as *game plans*, this variable is associated with the concept of *courses of action* (ways).[120]

This model "reveals the interaction among… key variables, and thereby represents a comprehensive approach to strategy development and force planning."[121] The key variables within the model consist of the main interactive parts contained in strategy and force planning. Also, in the case of this analysis the model will not be utilized to form a strategy; however, using the established strategy, this model will provide insights into the means (tools, capabilities, or concepts) that are developed such as sea basing. In essence, the model provides a framework that can be used in force planning decisions. In this chapter, the Bartlett strategic model will be used to analyze the current United States Security Strategy from a force planning point of view.

Figure 2: Bartlett Model[122]

This analysis assumes that the strategy (ways), goals, and resource constraints are established and fixed. For example, the budget is fiscally limited and tough decisions must be made. In other words, resource constraints will not be able to support every emerging concept or capability and as such this variable will not be modified. As for risk, the Quadrennial Defense Review and National Defense Strategy elaborate that the military will accept additional risk against traditional threats in order to reduce risk in areas such as irregular and catastrophic threat areas. With this in mind, the two key variables of security environment and tools (means) become the focus of the alignment necessary to properly plan the Department of Defense Force Planning. In both the 2004 National Military Strategy and the 2005 National Defense Strategy, the security environment is defined as uncertain. The Bartlett model illuminates the problems associated with an uncertain key variable. Although additional risks will be accepted

regarding traditional threats, nothing will guide or answer the question of how much risk. However, if a qualitative assessment of the security environment is established, then the appropriate tools can be developed or altered in a way to align the key variables effectively within the overall strategy.

An assessment of the security environment to something other than uncertain does not impact the overall desire for the military to transform, further joint integration, or the use of a capabilities based approach to defense planning. In fact, the introduction of a useable factor actually enhances the application of these ideas and concepts. One such method to assess and define the emerging 21st century security environment was developed by Thomas Barnett that considers the impacts associated with globalization.

Rethinking the Security Environment: *The Pentagon's New Map*

In an effort to characterize the emerging 21st century security environment with a qualitative approach, Thomas Barnett established links between globalization and future threats to the United States national interests. Basically, his analysis indicates that countries connected to the International market and rule sets of globalization are areas that feature "stable governments, rising standards of living, and more deaths by suicide than murder."[123] These areas represent the Functioning Core whereas the countries that either resists globalization or where connectedness is non-existent represent the Non-Integrating Gap. Essentially, countries that are not embracing globalization comprise the location of a majority of the United States operations since the end of the Cold War and are classified by the World Bank as *low income* or *low middle income*.

Using a world map, a line can be drawn that encompasses the identified Gap. This area consists of "namely the Caribbean Rim, virtually all of Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East and Southwest Asia, and much of Southeast Asia."[124] Additionally, using the information provided by the Central Intelligence Agency, the average literacy of all the identified Gap countries in Africa is 57.5%. [125] Illiteracy along with low income has proven through history to be areas where terrorism flourishes. Outliers identified in Barnett's "The Pentagon's New Map" include "an Israel isolated in the Gap, a North Korea adrift within the Core, or a Philippines straddling the line."[126] When the location of major United States military operations during the period of 1990 to 2003 which consists of 127 operations (combat, show of force, contingency positioning/reconnaissance, evacuation/security, or peacekeeping) is overlaid on Barnett's new map, it is apparent that all but six took place in the identified gap.[127]

This type of assessment of the 21st century security environment makes tough, fiscally constrained decisions more manageable. If this truly becomes the United States assumed security environment, will sea basing be an effective joint force enabler? Of the 127 military operations that occurred during the period of 1990 - 2003, only three could be considered major combat operations. A sustained force of two brigades would be a considerable, lethal force for the remaining 124 operations. In these cases, concepts such as sea basing would enable the Combatant Commander to quickly respond to contingency operations, support declining governments, or provide the necessary assistance in order to provide additional stability without establishing permanent basing or having to support base security requirements. With the use of sea basing, either Marines or Soldiers could be used as the ground forces. Currently, the Navy is working to develop capabilities

necessary to use Marines as the ground force. As for the Army, deliberations are being considered as to the use of Army forces within the sea basing concept. In order to use the Army within the context of sea basing, heavy lift assets required to transport Army equipment would need to be developed along with modifications to the Army combat logistic ships. These modifications would enable the use of the four Army Pre-positioned Sets in a sea basing context. Lessons learned from Operations in Somalia further illustrate the applicability of sea basing along with potential operational integration options.

Somalia: Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned

In December 1992, the United Nations decided to include limited military operations as part of the coalition humanitarian effort in Somalia. The name of the operation was called *Restore Hope* with 28,000 of the 38,000 troops provided by the United States. In order to employ the necessary forces and logistics for the operation, Transportation Command utilized airlift and sealift. Prior to the arrival of sealift assets, personnel and material arrived via airlift, however, approximately 95 percent of the forces, equipment, and fuel came via the sea. The austere nature of both the APOD and SPOD within Somalia presented problems. The APOD could only support two aircraft at a time and the SPOD could only handle one ship. Additional issues prohibiting maximum utilization of sea transportation included the prevailing sea state and the water depth of the harbor which hindered the offload operations.[128]

Although the Marine Pre-position Squadrons were utilized during Operation Restore Hope, their utilization after incorporating the sea basing concept would have eliminated

the logistical problems encountered. First, sea basing will be able to sustain up to two

Marine Expeditionary Brigades which consist of nominally 14,000 troops which is

equivalent to half of the total American contribution. Additionally, the sea base will be

able to conduct operations up to sea state four which is higher than was encountered

during the operation. During Operation Restore Hope, the sea state negatively effected

the offload of materials causing delays. Finally, the condition of the APODs and SPODs

in the region that would be used to transport the remaining Marines that aren't already on

station are more than adequate to support seaborne air and sea connectors.

<u>Case Study: Indonesia</u>

   In order to further assess the capabilities of sea basing, a fictitious case study

involving Indonesia will be used. Identified in Barnett's "The Pentagon's New Map" as

one of the countries within the *Gap*,[129] Indonesia is a good example because of its

topography, location, economy, and society. First, as depicted in figure 3, "Indonesia is

the largest archipelagic nation in the world. It encompasses more than 17,000 islands …

about 1,000 are permanently settled. The five main islands are Java, Kalimantan, Papua,

Sumatra, and Sulawesi."[130] Second, this archipelagic nation is located in a strategic

position in Southeast Asia with a coastline of approximately 34,000 miles on important

bodies of water that include the Indian Ocean, Straits of Malacca, South China Sea, and

the Pacific Ocean.[131] Strategically, it is positioned along and within one of the world's

largest commercial trade routes in the Pacific Command area of responsibility. This is

particularly important because part of the Global Defense Posture's access strategy

consists of using the improved sea basing capabilities within this Combatant

Commander's region.

Figure 3: Indonesia[132]

Third, Indonesia is rich in natural resources. They are "the world's number one

exporter of liquefied natural gas and the seventh largest oil producer."[133] Their major

trade partners are Japan, the European Union, the United States, Singapore, and the

Republic of Korea (South Korea); trade with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members is increasing."[134] Finally, "Indonesia has the fourth largest population after China, India, and the United States"[135] and "the largest Islamic population in the world."[136] Of their 17,000 islands, approximately 50% of the population lives on the island of Java.[137] In 1945, they claimed their independence from the Netherlands[138] and their government is "republic based on limited separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches."[139] Indonesia's primary security "threat is that of international terrorism."[140] Within the country, police investigations have "revealed an extensive network of affiliations among al-Quaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, and Islamic extremist groups."[141] This makes Indonesia a particularly good example due to the current U.S. involvement with the Global War on Terrorism.

As for the fictitious scenario, Indonesia is experiencing an increase of insurgency operations on the island of Java due to the government support of American efforts in the Middle East as part of the Global War on Terrorism. The insurgents are trying to cause a civil war that will inevitably remove the existing government. In response to the growing unrest and instability within the country, Indonesia has requested support from the United States to maintain stability within its borders.

As a possible course of action to fulfill this mission, sea basing is chosen by the Combatant Commander. As part of the initial execution an Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is stationed in an operational area just beyond territorial waters in the vicinity of Jakarta. The Indonesia capital, "Jakarta, on the western end of Java, is the largest city with an estimated population of 11.4 million in mid-2001."[142] A Marine Pre-positioning Squadron is placed into a

standby readiness status in Singapore near Indonesia along with enough Marines to augment the MEU to a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) size force. Additionally, another MEB is stationed in Okinawa ready to flow to the sea base via either Singapore or Port of Darwin, Australia, depending on whether the operation is on an eastern or western Indonesian island. As for a Carrier Strike Group, none are available, so the Air Force will support if needed from forward operating bases. Meanwhile, Army airborne assets will be given *be prepared to* mission in the event of a possible regime change.

In order to determine the optimum course of action, the Combatant Commander conducted wargaming analysis. From this analysis, several insights impacted the final decision. First, sea basing provides a sustainable minimal footprint. A sea base can be established and maneuvered anywhere along the 34,000 miles of Indonesian coastline. With a sustainable operational reach of 90 NM, over 50% of the Indonesian population can be influenced with a scalable force of a MEU or one to two MEBs. With approximately 50% of the population living on the island, Java is less than 120 miles wide at its widest point.

Second, the decision to use Marine Corps forces as the ground element enables Army expeditionary forces to remain available for tasking to other potential theater missions. This is an important consideration because there is a potential for the Indonesia support mission to last for a prolonged period of time. The Marine Corps ground forces have demonstrated their stability operations capabilities while working interchangeably with the Army forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Also, MEUs are capable of performing Non-combatant Evacuation Operations of United States citizens.

Overall, the arranged forces provide a flexible, rapid option for the Combatant Commander without a permanent footprint since the sea basing removes the shoreline as a seam and are able to directly sustain up to two brigades. The MEU has 15 days of support and an ability to expand to a MEB with 30 days support[143] with the forces on standby in Singapore. The Army airborne forces are available in the event that either three brigades are required or the support is required for distances greater than 90 miles from the sea base. Also, the Army airborne forces are available to secure an APOD as the sea based MEB secures a SPOD. All of these examples are operation integration possibilities. As for the ESG itself, the location of Indonesia enables the naval forces to be multi-tasked to protect Sea Lines of Communication as well as remain ready to provide assistance to the numerous other islands in the vicinity. Just recently a tsunami caused severe destruction in Indonesia which required short notice relief support from the United States.[144]

If the operation continues to escalate, the Air Force will be called upon to transfer the MEB stationed in Okinawa to Singapore or Port of Darwin, Australia where high speed connectors will move these forces to the sea base. As stated earlier, the third brigade would be the standby airborne brigade. In the advent of a regime collapse, driving major combat operations, the sea based forces can enable access by securing a SPOD concurrently with Army establishing an APOD. Additionally, Army forces can be transported from the United States to Singapore or Port of Darwin, Australia and introduced into Indonesia via the high speed connectors and the sea base while the Army combat logistic ships and Air Force mobility assets deliver the accompanying equipment to the SPOD and APOD. The ability to flow the ground forces (individual Soldiers or

Marines) does not increase the cost of sea basing. Developing the heavy lift assets required to transport Army equipment and modifications to the Army combat logistic ships represent the additional costs referred to earlier as the potential budgetary trade space necessary to fully integrate Army capabilities into the sea basing concept.

Finally, due to the limited amount of lift required for coalition personnel, government agency capabilities, and Special Operation Forces, they can be also deployed to the sea base along with the Marine ground forces and employed throughout the region. In fact, the escort ships such as the new design Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) have a large enough flight deck to support most helicopters and can be used to support either Special Operating Forces or other government agency operations. The LCS is being developed as a modular design. Each ship can be reconfigured for tailored operations such as mine clearance and submarine warfare. Although no program of record currently develops an anti-terrorist or special operations model, this type of configuration could entail communication and personnel support capabilities necessary to optimize support for more terrorist oriented missions as part of the sea basing concept.

Overall, sea basing provides the most flexible course of action option for the Combatant Commander. A relatively small number of forces are committed yet able to increase in strength as necessary without establishing a footprint ashore which minimizes potential anti-western sentiment and does not unnecessarily provoke the insurgents. Additionally, since Indonesia is an archipelagic nation, forces based at sea provide flexible maneuverability between the different islands.

Chapter 6

Significance of research/findings

Major themes of *jointness* and *transformation* are prevalent throughout the United States military. In an effort to conform to this guidance, the Services are following approved Transformation Roadmaps and designing future forces from the guidance delineated in national strategies and the Transformation Planning Guidance documents. However, changing or restructuring the military and developing new capabilities to adhere to the guidance is expensive. Currently, the United States is in an expected long term conflict against terrorism with an already constrained fiscal budget.

With the military's current drive to change its culture in the way it fights in the 21st century, difficult decisions need to be made to determine investment priorities. This research illustrates issues associated with defense budget decisions. A capability based approach to defense planning in conjunction with a security environment that is uncertain leads to a determination that most of the developing concepts and capabilities are beneficial and required. Services are developing capabilities to fill a niche against basically every threat. This result is particularly true since each emerging capability is developed using the guidelines within the national strategies and the transformation pillars.

Thus, the question that arises is which capability is more appropriate or applicable and as such should receive higher development priority in a fiscally constrained budget. As demonstrated in this research, the Bartlett strategy model along with Barnett's quantified assessment of the 21st century security environment provides an alternative approach toward making defense investment decisions. This is the case concerning the applicability of sea basing. Specifically, sea basing not only meets current guidance, it is an enabling capability that effectively addresses the most likely future operations.

Finally, this research addressed the important issue of *jointness*. Although the definition of joint forces focuses on the number of Military Departments in order to optimize the overall effectiveness within the Department of Defense, it is a limited parochial approach. This study illustrates how this type of approach can be contradictory with a capability based approach to defense planning. Furthermore, a determination of *jointness* based on integration at the operational level is less parochial and fosters the capitalization of inherent Service core competencies. Particularly, ground forces should be integrated within a capability to fill a gap and not based on whether they are from another Military Department.

Chapter 7

Recommendations

Analysis concerning the applicability of sea basing in the 21st Century joint environment provided valuable insights into the definition of joint operations, security environment assessments, and the concept itself. These insights form a basis for three distinct recommendations. First, an operation should be considered joint if it integrates warfighting at the operational level between two Services. Currently, doctrinal definitions aren't consistent, cause confusion, and lead to unaffordable redundant capabilities. In doctrine, the definition of joint operations refers to the participation of two or more military departments. On the other hand, the definition of joint amphibious operations uses two or more Services as a delineator. The Marine Corps is a Service but not its own military department. Thus, according to the definition of joint amphibious operations, the integration of Navy and Marine Corps forces is considered joint. However, according to the joint operations definition, an amphibious landing would have to incorporate Army forces to be considered joint. In sea basing, this issue is being discussed and debated because it will cost developmental money to employ Marine Corps ground forces within the concept. Army employment would require additional funding in a fiscally constrained environment. Yet, the employment of two Army brigades vice two Marine Corps brigades from a sea base does not fill an identified capability gap,

especially when the Air Force strategic lift is designed to employ expeditionary Army ground forces. Thus, in the development of sea basing, its *joint* capability should focus on integration at the operational level and not on the number of military departments.

Second, in order to maximize the effectiveness of a capabilities based approach to defense planning, the security environment must be more clearly defined in the National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy. Currently, the 21st Century security environment is defined as uncertain in these important documents. Although nothing is ever 100% certain, having an uncertain or undefined endstate leads to ambiguity, redundancy, and less than optimum efficiency. Especially while fighting a prolonged Global War on Terrorism, the Defense Department is bounded by a fiscally constrained budget. Thus, it is impossible to develop and maintain a force able to master all possible future scenarios. Yet, each Service currently can use whatever security environment characterization necessary to further a program. For example, in one instance a Service can justify spending funds on a capability versus an anti-terrorist type of environment, yet the justification for another capability designed to defeat another conventional foe would be easily defendable. In other words, identify the security environment that defines a capability gap and the program is justifiable. Barnett's "The Pentagon's New Map" is one example of a more qualitatively defined security environment. His environment is linked to globalization and world connectivity. While sea basing is a concept that is justified in most security environments, other competing developmental programs are more narrowly focused and a more qualitative definition would help to clarify defense planning decisions.

Finally, sea basing should continue to be funded as a Navy and Marine Corps power projection capability. The capabilities within the concept not only reside in the ground forces, but also the offensive capabilities inherent in the focus of naval combatants operating in the littoral environment. From the sea, the Combatant Commander will be able to utilize a scalable force that includes extended range fires, ground forces, and aircraft in conjunction with other joint forces arriving from other forward land bases.

Chapter 8

Conclusions

The removal of the historical seam between operations at sea and on land is a transformational leap necessary to support the 2004 National Military Strategy, 2005 National Defense Strategy, 2005 National Security Strategy, and the Global Defense Posture. The sea basing concept delineated in the corresponding Joint Staff's Joint Integrating Concept is a well founded means to remove this seam. Just as the development of formal amphibious doctrine in the 1930s laid the foundation for successful American influence in World War II and the Korean War, sea basing will provide another option for the United States to utilize globally in order to influence foreign policy with a minimal footprint. It truly represents a change in the way the Defense Department conducts operations.

The operational reach of two ground force brigades with sea basing reduces the requirement for an amphibious lodgment. Yet, it can be used to influence at least 60% of the world's population along with all of the global coastal economic trade centers. Independent of the Service providing the ground forces, sea basing provides political flexibility. History has demonstrated that major combat operations are few and far between compared to the United State's involvement in smaller contingencies that are necessary to protect America's vital national interests. Without employing ground forces

from within another countries sovereign territory, the President can influence a region through forward presence, a scalable response up to two brigades, and assist in the transition to a potential major combat operation. The minimum footprint achieved through sea basing not only supports the Global Defense Posture, but also facilitates cooperation from the other countries because a perception of foreign occupation is non-existent.

Although sea basing is an effective enabler that may help to seize the early initiative with a more rapid response, it is not a capability that will independently win a major combat operation. The United States has never fought a major combat operation with two ground force brigades. World War II, the Vietnam War, the Korean War, Operation Just Cause, Operation Dessert Storm, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom are just several examples of major combat operations where the number of ground forces was significantly larger. They are also examples of operations utilizing both Marine Corps and Army ground forces to successfully defeat the enemy. With an understanding of the extent to which sea basing can support two brigades, a decision must be made in a fiscally constrained environment as to which Service should be employed from the sea. Currently, the Marine Corps traditionally operates and employs expeditionary power projection from the sea. Whereas, the Army's expeditionary employment has traditionally centered on airborne operations integrated with the Air Force. Although both Services would successfully complete missions from the sea base, there is no significant advantage to employ and sustain Soldiers vice Marines from the sea. Sea basing is an effective joint force enabler without the need for employing Army forces from the sea.

[1] The 2006 National Security Strategy was published after the strategy research was completed for this paper. Although the research utilized the 2002 National Security Strategy, nothing in the new 2006 version impacts the analysis conducted.

[2] U.S. Congress, Public Law 104-201, *Military Force Structure Review Act of 1996*, accessed 20 January 2006, from www.defenselink.mil/topstory/quad_leg.html, 1996, sections 921-922,

[3] Ibid, section 922.

[4] Ibid, section 922.

[5] Ibid, section 922.

[6] U.S. Department of Defense, "Sea Basing: Poised for Takeoff*," Transformation Trends,* Thomas Hone, Assistant Director, Risk Management, Office of Force Transformation, (Arlington, D.C.: 15 February 05), accessed 20 December 2005, from http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/trends_372_Transformation _Trends_15_February 2005%20Issue.pdf, 1.

[7] U.S. Department of Defense, 2005 Testimony, *Statement of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld FY 2006 Department of Defense Budget Senate Armed Services Committee*, accessed 14 April 2006, from http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2005/February/Rumsfeld%2002-17-05.pdf, 17 February 2005, 3.

[8] Ibid, 2.

[9] Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy*, Secretary of Defense, (Washington D.C.: 2005), 6.

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